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Conclusion
Despite recent responses designed to combat the increased lia-
bility exposure of directors and officers, the personal risks for cor-
porate insiders remain significant. With corporations operating in
an ever-complex regulatory maze,1 there has been an increased fo-
cus on corporate accountability.2 The difficulty in resolving direc-
tor and officer liability issues, however, arises in balancing the need
to punish misguided fiduciaries with the need to protect aggressive
managers who take good faith risks to produce increased corporate
profits.3 While long-range solutions to this balancing problem are
essential, directors and officers should pursue short-term tactics to
reduce their risk of personal liability.
Because it is relatively easy to allege that an individual has
breached a fiduciary duty, a director or officer may become em-
broiled in a lawsuit without actually doing anything "wrong." Con-
sequently, all directors and officers should attempt to reduce their
exposure to liability. In particular, corporate insiders should un-
derstand that certain decisions are especially susceptible to litiga-
tion and, therefore, more likely to result in personal liability.
Courts are more inclined to second-guess management decisions
that impact on shareholders' "ownership" rights.4 For example, if a
board of directors approves a cashout merger plan that underval-
ues the shareholders' stock, a court may be more inclined to find
the directors personally liable.5 In this instance, management's de-
1. See Perkins, Avoiding Director Liability, HARv. Bus. REv., May-June 1986, at 8, 8
(stating that "[t]he Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, environmental laws and regulations,
comprehensive disclosure requirements for corporate securities transactions, and banking
regulations - covering everything from insider loans to foreign exchange transactions - are
all examples of the tighter legal requirements for which boards are now responsible").
2. Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and
Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 1993 (1978) (indicating that "[tihere is a growing awareness that
the power of corporations and corporate managers carries with it certain responsibilities,
both to shareholders and to the public").
3. Id. at 1993-94.
4. Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van
Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 5 (1985). The author indicates that management decisions gener-
ally concern two types of issues: "enterprise" issues and "ownership claim" issues. An exam-
ple of an enterprise issue is a management decision to expand the corporation's business
operation. An example of an ownership claim issue is a management decision to exchange a
block of common stock for an asset of questionable value.
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also supra Recent
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cision has severed the shareholders from their investment and
caused them to suffer a loss in their role as "owners" of stock.' In
contrast, a decision by the board of directors to enter a new prod-
uct market that eventually turns sour is unlikely to result in liabil-
ity. Although shareholders may suffer a loss on their investment
because of the board's decision, the loss is incurred in the share-
holders' capacity as investors. Consequently, management should
exercise greater caution on decisions that directly affect the share-
holders' "ownership" interests-decisions concerning, for example,
stock issuance, redemption, cashout, or merger."
In addition, management should establish clear job descrip-
tions and decisionmaking procedures. Liability frequently attaches
if a corporate insider acts outside the scope of the insider's duties
or neglects an area of responsibility for which the insider is ac-
countable. Written job descriptions for directors and officers en-
sure that managers are apprised of their responsibilities, both indi-
vidually and in relation to the management operation as a whole.9
Similarly, the functions of various board committees and their
members should be delineated clearly.
In order to avoid liability, corporate managers also should be
prepared adequately before each business meeting. This requires
directors and officers to read all appropriate reports and digest the
information contained therein. In Smith v. Van Gorkom 0 the Del-
aware Supreme Court concluded that the board of directors acted
in a grossly negligent manner by approving amendments to a
merger proposal without familiarizing themselves with the con-
tents of the documents. 1 To encourage corporate directors and of-
ficers to do their homework, minutes of previous meetings and a
clearly delineated agenda of future meetings should be timely dis-
tributed to each board member.
Corporate managers should conduct their meetings in a busi-
Developments (Special Project) notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
6. Manning, supra note 4, at 5-6. The author analogizes this situation to one in which
an individual receives a letter proclaiming, "This will inform you that I have just sold your
house. Check is enclosed."
7. Id. at 5.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Curtner, Ensuring D&O Loss Control, RISK MGMT., Oct. 1986, at 42, 44.
10. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
11. In particular, the court noted that Mr. Van Gorkom, Trans Union's chief executive
officer, countersigned the merger agreement without reviewing the documents to determine
if they were consistent with the authority previously granted him by the board. In addition,
the court concluded that neither Mr. Van Gorkom nor any other member of the board read
the documents before executing the merger agreement. Id. at 879.
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nesslike and unbiased fashion. Thus, the board of directors should
follow corporate formalities, including keeping minutes of all board
and committee meetings, in conducting their meetings. The mere
appearance of conducting corporate matters in an unbusinesslike
and less than serious manner may support a finding that a fiduci-
ary did not exercise due care."2 In addition, corporate managers
should ask tough questions at their meetings. Corporate records
indicating that questions have been asked and satisfactorily an-
swered is a positive factor in demonstrating that directors and of-
ficers exercised due care.' Conversely, records indicating that no
questions were asked may indicate that corporate insiders were not
sufficiently informed to make a valid business judgment. 4 Finally,
questions frequently will help avoid serious errors in judgment by
enabling directors and officers to consider every alternative to a
given proposal.'
5
Corporate managers should keep a complete record of all doc-
uments essential to the organization, including relevant financial,
legal, and personnel records, as well as individual director and of-
ficer files. Effective documentation makes it easier to refute or de-
fend allegations of wrongdoing because a corporate defendant can
demonstrate more readily what action was taken, when it was
taken, why it was taken, and by whom it was taken.'6 Failure to
maintain an evidentiary trail of the corporate decisionmaking pro-
cess can be fatal.'7 Corporations should improve existing documen-
tation procedures and establish a records retention policy to guar-
antee that important documents are not thrown out prematurely.18
12. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 879 (Del. 1985) (indicating that the chief
executive officer signed the merger agreement at a social function he was hosting).
13. Perkins, supra note 1, at 12.
14. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court
adjudged the Trans Union directors grossly negligent in approving a merger, observing that:
The Board did not request its Chief Financial Officer, Romans, to make any valuation
study or review of the proposal to determine the adequacy of $55 per share for sale of
the Company .... No director sought any further information from Romans. No di-
rector asked him why he put $55 at the bottom of his range. No director asked Romans
for any details as to his study, the reasons why it had been undertaken or its depth. No
director asked to see the study ....
Id. at 877.
15. See Perkins, supra note 1, at 12.
16. See Curtner, supra note 9, at 43.
17. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878 (Del. 1985) (imposing liability in
situation in which the merger agreement was not produced by the defendants).
18. Curtner, supra note 9, at 43. The author recommends that most files should be
kept for three to seven years. In addition, the author urges corporate managers to be careful
in writing memos that become part of the documentation effort. Because of liberal discovery
1987]
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Finally, directors and officers should make effective use of cor-
porate legal counsel. Each organization faces unique legal concerns
and, therefore, should consult independent counsel to determine
what the law requires with respect to the individual duties of man-
agement as directors and officers and with respect to the legal re-
sponsibilities of the organization as a whole.19 Legal counsel can
clarify the issues to which the business judgment rule might apply
and determine which issues might raise legal implications that
would prevent the rule from operating fully. 0 The use of counsel
in this fashion will ensure that corporate managers understand










rules, the author argues that a plaintiff's counsel can obtain almost all written materials. As
a result, corporate insiders should not assume that internal memos always will be held confi-
dential and, therefore, should avoid writing what the author refers to as "stupid memos."
Id. at 43-44.
19. Id. at 44.
20. Perkins, supra note 1, at 14.
* The editor would like to thank David Freeman and Huger Hardie for their tireless
and much-appreciated help.
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